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Christine Clavien and Samia Hurst 1  (henceforth C&H) make at least three valuable 
contributions to the literature on responsibility and healthcare. They offer an admirably clear 
and workable set of criteria for determining a patient's degree of responsibility for her health 
condition; they deploy those criteria to cast doubt on the view that patients with lifestyle-
related conditions are typically significantly responsible for their conditions; and they outline 
several practical difficulties that would be raised by any attempt to introduce responsibility-
sensitive healthcare funding. I am sympathetic to the general thrust of their argument, 
share—at least tentatively—their policy conclusions, and was persuaded by much of the detail 
of their argument. However, I do have three critical comments.  
 
Type 1 Psychological Processes and Responsibility 
 
First, I believe that C&H are too swift in their treatment of rapid, automatic, ‘type 1’ 
psychological processes and the relevance of these processes to responsibility. In their 
discussion of their ‘Condition 4’, according to which responsibility depends on control, they 
treat type 1 processes as factors that limit control, and thus diminish responsibility, rather 
than as mechanisms via which we exercise control. It is presumably for this reason that, in 
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Table 1, they classify ‘[s]trong gustatory pleasure for salt, sugar and fats’ as a responsibility 
-mitigating factor.  
 This classification presupposes that type 1 processes are external to the autonomous 
agent or ‘chooser’ rather than being part of the way that the autonomous agent chooses. It 
is not clear, however, that this is always the case. 
 Consider a fictional character often discussed in philosophical moral psychology: Mark 
Twain’s Huck Finn. In Chapter 16 of The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn, Huck, who is 
helping Jim, a slave, to escape to freedom, experiences pangs of conscience.2 Huck’s explicit 
deliberation leads him conclude that he ought not to help Jim escape—that in doing so, he is 
collaborating in a wrong. He judges that he ought to abort the escape mission and turn Jim 
in, but something deep inside him—some barely conscious feeling of sympathy for Jim—
prevents him from doing so, and Huck ends up enabling Jim to reach his freedom.   
 C&H’s view seems to imply that Huck is not responsible, and thus not praiseworthy, 
for helping Jim to escape, since his helping is based on a type 1 process, not his explicit moral 
deliberation. But this is hard to accept. Surely Huck is praiseworthy. Indeed, it seems 
plausible to think that the fact that he has to overcome his (faulty) explicit moral deliberation 
to do the right thing makes him even more praiseworthy than he would otherwise have been.  
 More generally, it seems plausible to think that we can often be fully responsible, and 
thus highly praise- or blame-worthy, for actions that we do from rapid, automatic, and even 
subconscious processes.3 Yet this appears to be ruled out by C&H’s view of the relevance of 
type 1 processes to responsibility.  
 
Implications for Tort and Criminal Law 
 
A second worry about C&H’s argument concerns its possible implications beyond the sphere 
of healthcare. I am thinking, in particular, of its implications for criminal and tort law. C&H’s 
argument may seem to imply that many people whom most of us would think are morally 
liable to criminal punishment or compensatory damages are in fact not so-liable, since they 
are not responsible for the harmful outcomes that they (probably) cause.  
 Suppose that the owner of a small plumbing business negligently allows five of her 
employees to be exposed to very high levels of asbestos fibres; she fails to warn them that a 
work site is heavily contaminated with the substance and that protective measures are thus 
required. Suppose, further, that this exposure, in combination with a complex set of genetic 
predispositions and chance mutations, causes one of these employees to develop lung cancer 
later in life.   
 C&H’s argument may seem to have implausible implications regarding the employer’s 
responsibility in this case. To bring this out, let me make three further stipulations. First, 
 
suppose that, though the asbestos exposure was certainly necessary for the development of 
the cancer, at least some of the genetic predispositions and mutations were necessary too, and 
the relative causal contribution of these factors is unclear. Second, suppose that the employer 
was—like most people4,5—only vaguely aware of the relationship between asbestos exposure 
and cancer, and had no knowledge that the relationship was so strong. Third, suppose that 
the employer’s decision to expose the workers was the result of a type 1 process: she was 
informed of the asbestos contamination while in the middle of dealing with a sick child, and 
just a few minutes before her employees were due to begin work; wanting to avoid further 
stress, she quickly dismissed the thought that she should warn her workers or call off the job.  
 Even with these further stipulations most of us would, I think, want to maintain that 
the employer is substantially responsible for the employee’s cancer, but it is hard to see how 
C&H could accommodate this intuitive verdict. They seem committed to holding that the 
employer’s responsibility is mitigated by fact that the employer is fundamentally responsible 
only for her action, not for the resulting bad outcome, and there is only an uncertain and 
complex causal connection between two (Condition 1), by the employer’s lack of knowledge 
(Condition 3), and by the rapid and automatic nature of the psychological process leading to 
her failure to prevent the exposure (Condition 4).  
 More generally, I worry that C&H’s views may have radical—and, at least in some 
cases, intuitively unappealing—implications in many criminal and tort cases. I suspect their 
view will imply that many legal systems are currently punishing, or imposing compensatory 
damages on, individuals who are only to a small degree responsible for the relevant outcomes, 
and I doubt these implications will accord with the intuitions of most. Perhaps C&H would 
be be willing to embrace these radical implications. Prevailing criminal and tort law practices 
are, after all, controversial. It would be interesting to know their thoughts on this.  
 There is, admittedly, one important difference between most criminal and tort cases—
including my asbestos example—and the sorts of healthcare cases that C&H have in mind. 
Torts and crimes are typically clearly morally wrong, whereas, as C&H note, the sorts of 
lifestyles that lead to disease are, in most cases, not obviously wrong. However, C&H largely 
set aside this issue in their discussion.6 Their core arguments against responsibility for disease, 
and against responsibility-sensitive healthcare policies, are based on factors independent of 
the the (perceived) wrongness of the health-risking choices and lifestyles, and it is these 
independent factors (C&H’s Conditions 1-4) that, I think, generate unattractive implications 






The Argument for Responsibility-Sensitive Healthcare Funding 
 
My third worry is that C&H undersell the principled argument in favour of responsibility-
sensitive approaches to healthcare funding by failing to acknowledge the main virtue of such 
policies: someone has to bear the costs of healthcare, and, other things being equal, it is better 
that costs are borne by those more responsible for creating those costs than by those who are 
less responsible.  
 Consider a case in which, notwithstanding C&H's arguments, we would think that a 
patient bears a substantial degree of responsibility for acquiring an illness. Consider, for 
instance, a well-educated and wealthy individual who, as an adult, makes the deliberate and 
well-informed decision that he would prefer to live a short life filled with gustutory and bodily 
pleasures than a longer but less fullsome life. He embarks on a life of copious consumption of 
rich food and fine wine, and after a dozen years of this, develops Type 2 diabetes as a result. 
This patient—call him the Bon Vivant—now requires an expensive treatment—dialysis for 
diabetic kidney disease, say.7  
 Let us suppose that the Bon Vivant is significantly responsible for his diabetic kidney 
disease, as I think even C&H would concede. The situation, then, is this: someone has to foot 
the bill for his dialysis, if he is going to receive it. The most salient alternatives are: (i) he 
bears the bill himself, or (ii) the bill is transferred to taxpayers (or, in countries with a social 
insurance system of healthcare, to those who pay compulsory health insurance premiums). 
Imposing costs on taxpayers has the advantage of allowing those costs to be spread thinly 
and more evenly across people and across time, but in a case where the patient is significantly 
responsible for his condition, as in this one, it also has the disadvantage of imposing the costs 
on individuals who are less responsible for it (taxpayers) rather than individuals who are more 
responsible (the patient). Indeed, some of the taxpayers who are required to contribute to the 
costs of this treatment will be precisely the faultlessly socially disadvantaged individuals 
whom C&H are most concerned to protect.  
 This, it seems to me, gives us a principled reason—though not a conclusive reason—
to leave at least some of the costs of dialysis with our Bon Vivant.  
 Note that this argument does not require holding that the Bon Vivant positively 
deserves, in any absolute sense, to be sick, or to bear the financial costs of his dialysis. Nor 
does it require us to hold that he ought to be punished or sanctioned for his health-risking 
behaviour. All it requires us to hold is that the costs will be more deserved (or even just less 
undeserved) if imposed on him than if imposed on those who will otherwise bear them, or 
that he is more liable to bear those costs than those others. Put crudely, it's not that leaving 
the Bon Vivant to bear (some of) the costs of his healthcare would be positively good, just 
that it would be less bad, in one respect, than the alternative.  
 
 Note also that this argument can be extended to cases in which a patient’s degree of 
responsibility for her illness is quite low. All it requires is that the patient is more responsible 
for it than those who will otherwise bear the cost.  
 Of course, none of this implies that we should—when all is said and done—reform our 
health systems so as to deny public funding to individuals like our imagined Bon Vivant. As 
I said at the outset, I concur with the view that we should not. That’s in part because, as 
mentioned above, non-responsibility-sensitive funding policies have the advantage of 
spreading costs more thinly and evenly. It’s also in part because considerations of 
responsibility would, in my view, at best justify only a relatively minor reduction of funding 
for those deemed responsible, and the moral benefits of implementing such minor reductions 
would, I think, be outweighed by the practical barriers to responsibility-sensitive healthcare 
funding. These are, as C&H highlight in Section 4 of their article, immense. 
 Nevertheless, there is, it seems to me, one quite strong principled reason in favour of 
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